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 Oral arguments are scheduled for Wednesday, June 27, 
2018, at 9:30 a.m. in the Courtroom of the Montana Supreme Court, 
Joseph P. Mazurek Justice Building, in Helena, Montana. Assistant 
Appellate Defender Alexander H. Pyle is expected to argue on 
behalf of Appellant Barrows and Assistant Attorney General 
Tammy A. Hinderman is expected to argue on behalf of Appellee 




The sole issue before the Court is whether the district court 
violated Barrows’ constitutional double jeopardy protections under 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution and Article II, § 25 of the Montana Constitution. The 
Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States Constitution and 
Montana Constitution declare that no person shall be put in jeopardy 
for the same offense twice.1  
In 2016, Barrows was convicted of three counts of assault 
with a weapon and two counts of illegal possession of dangerous 
drugs. At trial, the district court sua sponte dismissed one of the drug 
possession charges. Despite the dismissal, the district court later 
instructed the jury on the dismissed drug charge, and Barrows was 
convicted. 
Barrows appealed, providing the Court an excellent 
opportunity to clarify when the Double Jeopardy Clause is triggered. 
Specifically, the Court can resolve whether the Double Jeopardy 
Clause is triggered upon the dismissal of a single charge or upon the 
dismissal of an entire multi-count proceeding.   
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Barrows was pulled over after authorities received a report 
that he pointed a gun at another driver.2 After a legitimate search of 
Barrows’ vehicle, an officer seized a BB gun, baggies of 
methamphetamine, and baggies of prescription pills identified by 
the officer as Lorazepam.3 Barrows was arrested and charged with 
three counts of assault with a weapon, one count of possession of 
                                                 
1 U.S. CONST. amend. V; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 25. 
2 Appellee’s Response Brief at 3, State v. Barrows, 
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/APP/connector/2/369/url/321Z246_03WCCVM23003NSV.pdf 
(Mont. Mar. 22, 2018) (No. DA 17-0061). 
3 Id. at 4–5. 
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methamphetamine and one count of possession of Lorazepam.4  
At trial, the Nineteenth Judicial District Court of Lincoln 
County determined that the State failed to provide sufficient 
evidence of Lorazepam possession during its case-in-chief.5 The 
investigating officer identified the pills by typing the number printed 
on the pills into Drugs.com; believing this research was sufficient 
for identification purposes, the prescription pills were never sent to 
the State Crime Lab for testing.6 Consequently, the district court 
dismissed the charge midtrial, telling Barrows, “You are not going 
to be convicted of Lorazepam possession because I am not going to 
give that charge . . . I will dismiss the Lorazepam case. The 
Lorazepam charge is off.”7 
Following the sua sponte dismissal of the Lorazepam 
charge, Barrows testified.8 During his testimony, Barrows admitted 
not only to being in possession of prescription pills at the time of his 
arrest, but knowing the pills were Lorazepam.9 When it came time 
to decide jury instructions, the State proposed instructions relating 
to the dismissed Lorazepam charge.10 Without objection, the district 
court read jury instructions on the definition of Lorazepam and the 
required elements of Lorazepam possession.11 The jury convicted 
Barrows for all three counts of assault with a weapon and both 
counts of drug possession.12 
 
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
 
Barrows brings several claims on appeal; however, the Court 
limited oral argument to a single issue: whether the district court 
violated constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy when it 
convicted Barrows’ of possession of Lorazepam.13 The parties’ 
primary dispute is with the interpretation of Mont. Code Ann. §46–
16–403, which reads:  
When, at the close of the prosecution's evidence or at the 
close of all the evidence, the evidence is insufficient to 
support a finding or verdict of guilty, the court may, on 
its own motion or on the motion of the defendant, 
dismiss the action and discharge the defendant. 
                                                 
4 Appellant’s Opening Brief at 3–4, State v. Barrows, 
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/APP/connector/1/368/url/321Z246_03W910E6F005XJQ.pdf 
(Mont. Nov. 20, 2017) (No. DA 17-0061). 
5 Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 1. 
6 Id. at 4.  
7 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 4. 
8 Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 6. 
9 Id. at 6–7. 
10 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 5.  
11 Id.  
12 Id.  
13 Oral Argument Schedule, COURTS.MT.GOV, https://courts.mt.gov/courts/supreme/oral_arguments 
(last visited June 3, 2018). 
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However, prior to dismissal, the court may allow the 
case to be reopened for good cause shown (emphasis 
added).14  
The parties disagree about how the words “action” and 
“case” are defined within the statute’s context.15 Barrows argues 
these terms refer to a single charge, whereas the State argues these 
terms refer to an entire multi-count proceeding.16 The focus of the 
oral argument will likely be clarifying when double jeopardy is 
triggered: the moment the court dismisses a single charge during the 
multi-count proceeding or only once the entire proceeding has 
reached conclusion. 
 
A. Defendant-Appellant Barrows’ Argument 
 
Barrows argues his post-dismissal conviction for possession 
of Lorazepam directly violates the holding and policy in Smith v. 
Massachusetts.17 Barrows argues that he, like Smith, was convicted 
of a charge previously dismissed in violation of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause.18 The United States Supreme Court’s holding in Smith 
established that, even if a defendant introduces incriminating 
evidence after a midtrial dismissal, the dismissal must be treated as 
final unless there is a pre-existing rule allowing reconsideration.19 
Barrows asserts his conviction was everything the Smith Court 
wanted to prevent: influencing a defendant to testify candidly after 
a midtrial dismissal, re-jeopardizing the defendant if the charge 
reappears.20 
Additionally, Barrows highlights that Montana does not 
have a pre-existing rule establishing the availability of 
reconsideration.21 Barrows argues that § 46–16–403 does not allow 
reconsideration after a case is unequivocally dismissed, as the State 
contends.22 Barrows interprets the word “case” to mean a single 
charge in a multi-count proceeding.23 Essentially, Barrows 
interprets the statute to mean that, once a court has dismissed a 
single charge, the charge may not be reopened, regardless of 
whether additional charges remain in the proceeding.24 
Barrows maintains that his conviction for possession of 
                                                 
14 Mont. Code Ann. § 46–16–403 (2017). 
15 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 12–14; Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 
17. 
16 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 12–14; Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 
17. 
17 543 U.S. 462 (2005); Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 10.  
18 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 11. 
19 Id.; Smith, 543 U.S. at 473.  
20 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 11–13. 
21 Id. at 12; Mont. Code Ann. § 46–16–403. 
22 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 13. 
23 Id.  
24 Id. 
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Lorazepam violates §46–16–403 because the district court 
unequivocally dismissed the possession of Lorazepam charge.25 As 
such, the constitutional protections from double jeopardy effectively 
prevent the “case” from being reopened.26 
 
B. Plaintiff-Appellee State of Montana’s Response 
 
The State argues that the Double Jeopardy Clause is not 
violated when a court reconsiders a previously dismissed charge; 
however, the State concedes this is true only when there is a pre-
existing rule allowing reconsideration and additional charges in the 
proceeding remain.27 The State maintains that because only one of 
Barrows’ five charges was dismissed midtrial, the Double Jeopardy 
Clause was not triggered.28  
The State opposes Barrows’ interpretation of § 46–16–403, 
arguing that this statute authorizes reconsideration of a dismissed 
charge.29 Specifically, the State interprets the words “action” and 
“case” to mean an entire multi-count proceeding.30 The State argues 
that the plain language of the statute indicates that, unless a court 
has dismissed the entire multi-count proceeding, a court remains 
able to reconsider a charge after a midtrial dismissal.31  
The State maintains that the legislative intent behind § 46–
16–403 was not to discharge a defendant from custody unless all of 
their charges were dismissed.32 The State argues that if “action” 
means a single charge, then under the statute, a defendant would be 
discharged from custody after dismissal of a single charge.33 
Because Barrows’ entire proceeding was not dismissed midtrial and 
the district court had the ability to reconsider the charge, the State 
contends the dismissal of the possession of Lorazepam charge was 
not final and the Double Jeopardy Clause was not violated.34  
 
C. Defendant-Appellant Barrows Reply 
 
Barrows reasserts his interpretation of § 46–16–403, arguing 
that neither the statute nor Montana case law permit the revival of a 
previously dismissed charge.35 He further claims that “action” and 
                                                 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 22–23. 
28 Id.; Smith, 543 U.S. at 473.  
29 Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 16. 
30 Id. at 25; see State v. Forsythe, 390 P.3d 931 (2017).  
31 Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 2,. at 24. 
32 Id. at 25–26. 
33 Id.  
34 Id. at 25.  
35 Appellant’s Reply Brief at 3, State v. Barrows, 
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/APP/connector/1/368/url/321Z253_04JVJC3P90000T9.pdf 
(Mont. May 2, 2018) (No. DA 17-0061). 
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“case” within the context of the statute cannot translate to mean an 
entire multi-count proceeding, although these words may refer to an 
entire proceeding in other contexts.36 
Barrows disagrees with the State’s logic; specifically, he 
maintains that the State’s interpretation of the statute would suggest 
that courts can only dismiss an entire proceeding midtrial, not a 
single charge.37 Simply put, because the statute indicates, “[T]he 
court may, on its own motion . . . dismiss the action and discharge 
the defendant,” and the State interprets “action” to mean an entire 
proceeding, it does not follow that this statute permits courts to 
dismiss a single charge.38 Yet, Barrows contends Montana case law 
clearly establishes that § 46–16–403 allows for the dismissal of a 
single charge.39 Barrows persists the State’s interpretation of the 
statute is incorrect and does not authorize his conviction for 




The issue in this case is one of first impression for the Court. 
Although the Court has determined that a midtrial dismissal of a 
single charge is permissible, it has not yet discussed the validity of 
a double jeopardy claim after a defendant has been convicted for a 
dismissed charge in a multi-count proceeding.41  
The Court will likely agree with Barrows’ interpretation of 
§ 46–16–403. Montana’s double jeopardy jurisprudence focuses on 
whether a defendant has previously been put in jeopardy for an 
offense “equivalent to the offense with which Montana now charges 
him.”42 Therefore, the Court will likely determine Barrows was 
twice put in jeopardy for the same offense because he was tried for 
an identical charge twice. The State failed to provide sufficient 
evidence of Defendant’s possession of Lorazepam; yet, he was 
retried and convicted for this offense after the district court 
explicitly dismissed the charge midtrial.  
In Smith, the Court explained: “[I]f the prosecution has not 
yet obtained a conviction, further proceedings to secure one are 
impermissible . . . subjecting the defendant to post-acquittal fact 
finding proceedings going to guilt or innocence violates the Double 
Jeopardy Clause.”43 The Court will look to Smith for authority in 
this case and will likely determine that Barrows’ conviction for 
                                                 
36 Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 35, at 6–7.  
37 Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 35, at 5–6. 
38 Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 35, at 6. 
39 Id.; see State v. Gregori, 328 P.3d 1128 (2014); see State v. Hegg, 956 P.2d 754 (1998).  
40 Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 35, at 8. 
41 Id. at 6.  
42 State v. Kline, 305 P.3d 55, 58 (2013).  
43 Smith, 543 U.S. at 466 (citing Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 145 (1986)). 
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possession of Lorazepam was impermissible because his admission 
to possession of Lorazepam went directly to his guilt or innocence 
on that charge.   
Each parties’ interpretation of the statute has merit; however, 
Barrows will likely have the controlling argument. The State makes 
a strong argument that “action” and “case” refer to an entire 
proceeding based on the legislature’s reference to discharging the 
defendant upon dismissal of the action. The State’s argument that 
“discharging the defendant” refers to discharging them from an 
entire proceeding, not necessarily a single charge, is also persuasive. 
However, this argument ultimately will not convince the Court 
because Montana precedent clearly establishes that courts may 
dismiss single charges midtrial sua sponte. 
That being said, Barrows was clearly put in jeopardy twice 
for the same offense. The Court’s holding in State v. Cline44 
effectively established that the double jeopardy protections are 
triggered when a defendant is put in jeopardy for two equivalent 
charges. The district court unequivocally stated that the “Lorazepam 
charge was off”45 and established that the State failed to provide 
evidence sufficient for the charge. Consequently, Barrows was tried 
for an offense that the district court had already dismissed—a direct 
violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.  
 
V. Summary 
    
The parties’ contrary interpretations of § 46–16–403 provide 
the Court a great opportunity to clarify when double jeopardy 
protections are triggered. If the Court adopts the State’s statutory 
interpretation, Montana defendants may be tried for the same 
offense twice when their charge is dismissed and they are 
subsequently tried again for the same charge. Adopting Barrows’ 
argument, however, would ensure that defendants are not convicted 
if they candidly testify after a midtrial dismissal. If the State does 
not meet its burden but can nonetheless still try defendants for a 
charge post-dismissal, the integrity of the Double Jeopardy Clause 
is threatened. In sum, the Court must find § 46–16–403 does not 
authorize post-dismissal convictions. The Court’s decision in this 
case has the potential to safeguard the constitutional protection 
defendants have under the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
  
 
                                                 
44 Id. 
45 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 4. 
